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GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMERCE POWER
The first expression on the scope of the commerce power was
made by the Supreme Court in 1824, in Gibbons v. Ogden.' In that
case Chief Justice Marshall declared, "the power of Congress to regulate commerce is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost
extent, and acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed in
the Constitution ... the power of Congress is plenary." In addition
to showing some of the important developments of the commerce
power since the above mentioned case, this note proposes to consider
the future treatment of the question of federal regulation of hours
and wages by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has upheld
legislation of Congress in the fields of safety, labor relations, rate
discriminations and monopolies in restraint of trade. It has likewise
sustained legislation on hours and wages in a case of grave and
national emergency, during the duration of the emergency involving
a threatened strike of railroad employees on a national scale. 2 However, in the field of general wages and hours legislation the Supreme
Court has up to the present consistently denied to Congress the right
to regulate local manufacturing by the regulation of hours and wages
under the guise of the commerce power, particularly so in the cases
of Schechter Poultry Corp v. United States,3 Hammer v. Dagenhart4
and Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.5
The power of Congress to regulate commerce is derived from the
Federal Constitution, Article I, Section 8: "The Congress shall have
the power ... to regulate commerce ... among the several states... "
This commerce Chief Justice Marshall in his opinion in Gibbons v.
Ogden,6 described as "commercial intercourse between nations, and
parts of nations in all its branches" not merely "buying and selling"
and the "interchange of commodities." In effect he asserted that the
term "commerce" has the same meaning in the phrase "commerce
among the several states" that it has in the phrase "commerce with
foreign nations." It must, therefore, refer to every species of commercial intercourse among the states.
The decisions since Gibbons v. Ogden have further defined the
concept of what constitutes commerce. At the outset the concept was
limited to the prescription of rules that should govern interstate com19 Wheat. 1, 6 L.Ed. 23 (1824) (holding the right of a state to grant an
exclusive franchise to a navigable river was inferior to the right of Congress
to regulate such river for the use of interstate commerce).
2 Wilson
3

v. New, 243 U.S. 332, 37 Sup. Ct. 298, 61 L.Ed. 755 (1916).
Schechter Poultry Corp v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 56 Sup. Ct. 837, 79

L.Ed. 1570 (1935).
-247 U.S. 251, 38 Sup. Ct. 449, 62 L.Ed. 101 (1918).
5 259 U.S. 20, 42 Sup. Ct. 449, 66 L.Ed. 817 (1922).
6 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L.Ed. 23 (1824).
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merce. This doctrine was confined in Gibbo'ns v. Ogden to a negative
use only, that of telling the states what not to do. But with the
development of the United States and the Western migration pouring
thousands upon the lands beyond the Appalachians and the Mississippi,
this power was construed to allow Congress to authorize the construction of bridges and railroads 7 and to build them itself.8 Under this
phase extensive internal improvements were made. Not only did Congress assume that it could provide these instrumentalities, but it also
decreed that it was its duty to promote their growth and insure their
safety and advancement. 9
Where intrastate rates were a burden upon interstate commerce a
serious problem arose. To remedy this situation Congress regulated
activities clearly intrastate in character. In this connection the Supreme
Court has decided that where an intrastate transaction is a direct
burden upon interstate transportation, the power of Congress to legislate or to control such intrastate transaction will be upheld. The
Shreveport case 10 and R. R. Comm. of Wis. v. C. B. & Q. Ry. Co. 1 '
clearly illustrate this point. In the Shreveport case rate discriminations
by barriers between west-bound traffic from Shreveport, Louisiana,
to a point in Texas and east bound traffic from other points in Texas
to this same point in Texas, were held to be a burden upon interstate
commerce. An Interstate Commerce Commission order commanding
the roads to raise the rates charged to the citizens of Texas, as prescribed by the Railroad Act of Texas for intrastate traffic, to a parity
with rates charged to Shreveport shippers, described by the Interstate
Commerce Commission as reasonable, was held valid and within the
commerce power of the federal government. This case affected persons
and localities close to the border of the two states. In R. R. Comm. of
Wis. v. C. B. & Q. Ry. Co., an order of the Interstate Commerce
Commission under the Transportation Act of 192012 authorized the
establishment of a state-wide level of intrastate rates in order to prevent an unjust discrimination against interstate roads which were
7

Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 153 U.S. 525, 14 Sup. Ct. 891, 38 L.Ed.
808 (1894). Congress may organize a corporation for the purpose of constructing a bridge across the Hudson River and for the condemnation of
property for that purpose.
8Cal. v. Cent. Pac. R. R. Co., 127 U.S. 1, 83 Sup. Ct. 1073, 32 L.Ed. 150 (1887).
9The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557, 566, 19 L.Ed. 999 (1871). See Mobile County v.
Kimball, 102 U.S. 691, 26 L.Ed. 238 (1880); cf. Southern Ry Co. v. United
States, 222 U.S. 20, 32 Sup. Ct. 2, 56 L.Ed. 72 (1911). (Holding an Act of
Congress requiring equipment used in intrastate commerce to be provided
with the same safety devices required of equipment used in interstate comto be valid.)
10merce
Houston & Texas Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 34 Sup. Ct. 833,
58 L.Ed. 1341 (1914).
11257 U.S. 563, 42 Sup. Ct. 232, 66 L.Ed. 371 (1922).
1241 Stat. 456, 49 U.S.C.A. 71 (1920).
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charging a higher rate by order of the Interstate Commerce Commission. In both cases it appears that the decision was based upon the
undue burden the intrastate rates placed upon interstate commerce.
In the latter case the Interstate Commerce Commission did not attempt
to lower the interstate rates to a parity with the intrastate rates, but
went so far as to order the intrastate rates raised to a level found
by it to be a reasonable one for interstate carriers.
The power of the federal government to control intrastate activities will be upheld where such activities are intended to burden interstate commerce, as indicated by the second Coronado13 case, wherein
certain producers of commodities were attempting to control and
reduce the supply of such commodities by curtailment of production.
The court held that while mere reduction of the quantity of an article
to be shipped in interstate commerce by the illegal or tortious prevention of its manufacture or production is ordinarily an indirect and
remote obstruction of that commerce, nevertheless "when the intent
of those unlawfully preventing the manufacture or production is
shown to be to restrain or control the supply entering and moving in
interstate markets, it is a direct violation of the anti-trust act."
Similarly in a case involving a conspiracy of marketmen, teamsters and slaughterers, to burden the free movement of live poultry
to the metropolitan area of New York City by control of prices where
such poultry originated outside the state was an interference and a
burden upon interstate commerce. The court here felt that the interference of conspirators "with the unloading, the transportation and
sale by marketmen to retailers, the prices charged and the amount of
profits exacted, operated substantially to burden and restrain the
untrammelled shipment and movement of the poultry while unquestionably it was in interstate commerce."' 14 It is important to note that
the acts complained of occurred after the shipment in interstate commerce had ceased, but the effect was in operation even before such
termination.
Federal regulation of intrastate activities is not, however, limited
to the cases involving an undue burden upon interstate commerce by
monopolistic violations of the anti-trust laws, or by discriminatory
rates between intrastate and interstate carriers. In the recent case of
Consolidated Edison v. The National Labor Relations Board,5 the
power of the Board to regulate the relationship of employer and
employee was upheld even though the Edison Company was engaged
Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295, 45 Sup. Ct. 551,
69 L.Ed. 963 (1925).
'1Local 167 v. United States, 291 U.S. 293, 54 Sup. Ct. 396, 78 L.Ed. 804 (1934).
'5305 U.S. 197, 59 Sup. Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 131 (1938).
's

Coronado Coal
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in the local sale of power to local customers of both a private and
industrial nature in the city of New York and Westchester County.
Of the amount sold, 98% was used locally, while the remaining 2%
was used by consumers engaged in both foreign and interstate commerce. This latter amount was used by two interstate railroads and
one interstate tunnel company for the lighting and operation of passenger and freight terminals and trains. The Western Union Telegraph, Postal Telegraph and New York Telephone Companies also
used part of this latter amount for transmitting and receiving local
and interstate messages. In addition many pier facilities were dependent upon some of this latter 2%, as were the federal lighthouse
and harbor lights. In holding as it did the court was influenced by
the probable effect of an interruption of this service upon the stream
of commerce. The scope and magnitude of the operations carried on
by this company greatly influenced the court to decide that the effect
of interruption of such services could not be regarded as indirect and
remote. The effect rather than the source of the injury determines the
jurisdiction of the Board.
Prior to this time the Board had contended that if there was a
reasonable probability that certain labor practices would cause strikes
which would burden interstate commerce then it would have jurisdiction to control these practices. The present position, however, is that
if the Board determines that stoppage of operations by industrial strife
in a particular enterprise would result in what the board regards as a
substantial interruption of or interference with interstate commerce,
even though it be carried on wholly by others, then the Board has
jurisdiction.
The magnitude of the operations of a particular intrastate activity
and the probable effect of industrial strife upon interstate commerce
influenced the court also in the Jones & Laughlin 6 case to uphold as
valid a regulation of the National Labor Relations Board affecting
the employer-employee relationship and the right of the employee to
collective bargaining. The court here took notice of the fact that the
abridgment of the right of employees to organize is a prolific source
of industrial strife. Where the possibility of industrial strife would
affect a group of corporations such as the Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corporation, engaged in an enormous and wide-spread manufacturing
enterprise, the effect upon interstate commerce of stopping such an
indiistry was held to be sufficiently direct to allow federal regulation.
The court characterized the process whereby materials from subsidiary
corporations located in other states were sent to the central mill in
16 National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. I,

57 Sup. Ct. 615, 81 L.Ed. 893 (1937).
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Pennsylvania over company lines, there to be manufactured into finished and semi-finished products and then shipped to other states to
the ultimate consumers, as a definite and well understood course of
business. It was held that such movements of iron ore, coal and limestone to the mill, through it, and from it in the form of steel products
to the consuming centers of the country was so interdependent and
closely interwoven that the regulation must necessarily be of the
whole. Hence, again it was the fear of the possible cessation of these
activities and its effect upon interstate commerce that led the Supreme
Court to uphold the validity of the Board's orders.
It is interesting to note the argument of the petitioner in the Jones
& Laughlin case that even though materials used in the production
of goods originated in other states, the use of such materials was
essentially local and intrastate. Since this use was local in its immediacy, it counteracted and outweighed the fact that the materials had
an interstate origin; otherwise, every intrastate transaction which involved interstate transportation by others would come within the
federal control and thereby put an end to our federal system. It had
been held that where a utility company buys its supply of gas from
interstate distributors state jurisdiction is nevertheless paramount with
respect to the operation of the utility company. 7 In the Jones &
Laughlin case the court held that the National Labor Relations Act'
is not to be construed and applied so as to destroy the balance of the
constitutional system and federal regulation may not apply to wholly
intrastate activities unless their control "is essential or appropriate to
protect commerce from direct burdens and obstructions."
In the Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United States9 case,
the validity of the conviction of the corporation for violation of a
poultry code set up under the N.R.A. was questioned. The code,
establishing minimum wages and maximum hours, prohibiting selective killing and the selling of unfit chickens, was held to be an invalid
assumption of the federal power because the transactions of the
defendant did not directly affect interstate commerce so as to be
subject to federal regulation. The facts in this case indicate that
poultry was shipped from other states to New York City and there
picked up by defendant at the railroad terminals, transported to their
slaughter houses and slaughtered and sold to local retailers and
butchers. The court felt that these transactions were not "in" interstate commerce. It held that neither slaughtering nor the sale by
Missouri v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298, 44 Sup. Ct. 544, 68 L.Ed.
1027 (1924).
1s 49 Stat. 457, 29 U.S.C.A. 151 (1935).
29 Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 56 Sup. Ct. 837, 79
L.Ed. 1570 (1935).
17
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defendant to local retailers and butchers was interstate commerce,
therefore decisions which dealt with the stream of commerce were
not applicable here. 20 The court also held that defendant's transactions
did not directly "affect" interstate commerce so as to be subject to
federal regulation, and further, that the hours and wages had no
direct relation to interstate commerce.
Similarly, the court refused to sustain the validity of the bituminous coal act in the Carter Coal case. 2 ' The purpose of the bituminous
act was the stabilization of the coal industry through the regulation
of labor and prices. The court held that wages and hours were beyond
the powers of Congress to regulate because they had only an indirect
effect upon interstate commerce, and however great the effect might
be, it was not sufficient to give Congress power unless the effect was
direct. Here again the court refused to sustain legislation aimed at
controlling and stabilizing an entire industry, national in scope,
through the media of price, wage and hour control. In neither of these
cases did the court feel that the emergency was as urgent as in the
case of Wilson v. New,22 so as to sustain the codes even for a limited
time. The intricate chain of cause and effect was held an indirect
rather than a direct effect.
This principle, that Congressional regulation will be upheld when
the effect of the subject regulated upon interstate commerce is
direct and invalidated when it is indirect, is unavoidably vague. The
Supreme Court has therefore recognized the fact that the precise
line must be drawn only as individual cases arise, 2 but that it must be
drawn is certain if the federal system is to survive. 3
The court felt that to uphold the argument of the petitioner in the
Schechter case, that the control of wages and hours was a necessary
factor in maintaining the continued flow of interstate commerce in
the then existing emergency, would result in imposing federal control
upon all activities no matter how remote and indirect their effect upon
interstate commerce may be; or as Justice Cardozo stated in the same
case, "activities local in their immediacy do not become interstate and
national because of distant repercussions."
20

Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 25 Sup. Ct. 276, 49 L.Ed. 518
(1905). Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 42 Sup. Ct. 397, 66 L.Ed. 735
(1922). (It was held that Congress may prescribe regulations for the facilities
and services furnished to stockyards handling livestock shipped from the
Western ranches for the ultimate consumption in the East. In so holding the
court characterized the stockyards as great national public utilities "to promote the flow of commerce from the ranges and farms of the West to the

consumers in the East.")
21 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 56 Sup. Ct. 855, 80 L.Ed. 1160 (1936).
22Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332, 37 Sup. Ct. 298, 61 L.Ed. 755 (1916).
23 Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 56 Sup. Ct. 837, 79
L.Ed. 1570 (1935).
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Now whereas in the Schechter and the Carter Coal24 cases the
decisions were based partly on the absence of an easily defined policy
and a valid norm and partly because of the attempt to control completely the internal economic life of the states, the decisions in Hammer v. Dagenhart and the Child Labor Tax2 5 case were based primarily on the latter reason. In Hammer v. Dagenhart2 an act of Congress prohibiting goods manufactured within the state from entering
into interstate commerce if within 30 days prior to its shipment in
such commerce the manufacturer had employed any oppressive child
labor was held invalid. The invalidity did not rest on the fact that
there was a prohibition of goods from moving in interstate commerce,
but that it was an attempt to regulate an activity within the control of
the individual states. The mining of stone from the quarries and its
transformation into useful products was held to be a local activity.
The right to prohibit entry of goods into interstate commerce,
except where the ultimate effect is to control matters strictly within
the police power of the state, has not been denied to Congress as can
be seen in the case of lottery tickets,
30

7

impure foods 2
31

stolen cars,2 9

prison made goods, or intoxicating liquors.
In the case of lottery tickets the prohibition was based upon the
evil effect resulting from the sale of such tickets upon states to which
they were sent; while the evil inherent in the nature of impure foods
and drugs was sufficient to sustain federal regulation. In upholding
the prohibition on prison made goods the court stated that it was
not the nature of the goods themselves that constituted the evil, but
rather that it was the sale of convict made goods in competition with
the products of free labor. It held that free labor, properly compensated, cannot compete successfully with the enforced and unpaid or
underpaid convict labor of the prison. 32 Similarly, the motor vehicles
33
which are the subject of transportation prohibited in the Motor Act
are not in themselves inherently evil, yet in the Brooks34 case the court
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 56 Sup Ct. 855, 80 L.Ed. 1160 (1936).
U.S. 20, 42 Sup. Ct. 449, 66 L.Ed. 817 (1922).
26 247 U.S. 251, 38 Sup. Ct. 449, 62 L.Ed. 101 (1918) ; cf. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 42 Sup. Ct. 449, 66 L.Ed. 817 (1922). (Where a tax on
state manufacturers' net incomes for violation of federal child labor provisions was held invalid as an attempt to control a state activity under the
guise of the commerce power.)
27 Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 23 Sup. Ct. 321, 47 L.Ed. 492 (1903).
28
Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45, 31 Sup. Ct. 364, 55 L.Ed. 364
24

25 259

29 (1911).

Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432, 45 Sup. Ct 345, 69 L.Ed. 699 (1925).
30 Whitefield v. Ohio, 297 U.S. 431, 56 Sup. Ct. 532, 80 L.Ed. 778 (1936).
31
3 2 In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545, 11 Sup. Ct. 865, 35 L.Ed. 572 (1891).
Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Ill. Cent. R. R. Co., 299 U.S. 334, 57 Sup. Ct.
277, 81 L.Ed. 270 (1937).
3341
Stat 324, 18 U.S.C.A. 408 (1919).
34
Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432, 45 Sup. Ct. 345, 69 L.Ed. 699 (1925).
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felt that although they are in themselves useful and proper subjects
of interstate commerce, their transportation by one who knows they
have been stolen is "a gross misuse of interstate commerce" and Congress may punish it "because of the harmful result and its defeat of
the property rights of those whose machines against their will are
taken into other jurisdictions." In comparing the act prohibiting the
transportation of prison made goods with the act prohibiting the
transportation of liquor into states in violation of the laws of such
states the court decided that although the traffic and its effects are
different, the underlying policy is the same. The pertinent point is
that where the subject of commerce is one upon which the power of
the state may constitutionally be exerted by restriction or prohibition
in order to prevent harmful consequences, the Congress may, if it sees
fit, put forth its power to prevent interstate commerce from being
used to impede the carrying out of the state's policy. 5 It is equally
certain that an act of Congress prohibiting the transportation of goods
made with oppressive child labor into a state in violation of its laws
would be upheld as valid under the theory of the above mentioned
cases. But such an act would necessarily be limited in its operation
to the states which have enacted valid child labor laws, and would not
reach areas not having such regulations.
Apparently aware of the limited operation of such an act and not
certain that the Child Labor Amendment now seeking ratification will
receive the required approval by the states, Congress in 1938 passed
the Fair Labor Standards Act. 36 This Act prescribes minimum wages

and maximum hours for all industries engaged in interstate commerce
or in the production of goods for such commerce. It makes it unlawful for any person to transport or sell in commerce any goods in the
production of which any employee was employed in violation of the
hours and wages provisions. It likewise makes it unlawful to deliver
or sell any such goods with knowledge that they are intended for
interstate commerce.3 7 Further, it prohibits any producer or manufacturer or dealer from shipping or delivering for shipment in interstate
commerce any goods produced in an establishment within the United
States in or about which within thirty days prior to their removal
therefrom any oppressive child labor has been employed. 3 It defines
child labor as oppressive whenever an employee under the age of
sixteen is employed by an employer (other than a parent) in any
occupation; or any employee between the ages of sixteen and eighteen
35

Kentucky Whip and Collar Co. v. Ill. Cent. R. R. Co., 299 U.S. 334, 57 Sup.
Ct. 277, 81 L.Ed. 270 (1937).
36 Fair Labor-Standards Act, 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U.S.C.A. 201-219 (1938).
37 Ibid. § 215 (Prohibited Acts).
8 Ibid. § 212 (Child Labor).
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in any occupation which the Chief of the Children's Bureau of the
Department of Labor shall find to be hazardous or detrimental to

his health and well being.39 In addition it provides for a $10,000 fine
or six months imprisonment for any violation of a prohibited act plus
a liability to the employee affected to the amount of unpaid minimum
wages or their unpaid overtime compensation as the case may be,
and in addition an equal amount as liquidated damages.4 0 In passing
the regulations Congress stated its findings and policy as follows:
"(a) The Congress hereby finds that the existence, in industries
engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, of
labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum
standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general wellbeing of workers (1) causes commerce and the channels and instrumentalities of commerce to be used to spread and perpetuate such
labor conditions among the workers of the several States; (2) burdens
commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce; (3) constitutes an
unfair method of competition in commerce; (4) leads to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of goods
in commerce; and (5) interferes with orderly and fair marketing
of goods in commerce.
(b) It is hereby declared to be the policy of this chapter through
the exercise by Congress of its power to regulate commerce among
the several States, to correct, and as rapidly as practicable, to eliminate the conditions above referred to in such industries without substantially curtailing employment or earning power." 41
The validity of this act was first questioned in the recent case of
Andrew v. Montgomery Ward and Co.,4 2 which was decided by Judge
Holly of the Seventh District on November 22, 1939. In this case the
propriety of a subpoena duces tecum ordering a branch of the defendant company to produce its records on the number of hours worked
and wages paid to its employees, to facilitate an investigation as to
whether the act in question had been violated, was challenged on the
grounds of unconstitutionality in respect to the commerce power and
the due process clause. Judge Holly in holding the act within the
commerce power stated: "Certainly it cannot be maintained now that
Congress may not, in the interest of the general welfare of the country, prohibit the shipment in interstate commerce of the products of
underpaid and sweated labor." And again: "Regulation of wages and
39 Ibid. § 203.
40 Ibid. § 216 (Penalties; civil and criminal liability).
41 Ibid. § 202 (Congressional finding and declaration of policy).
4230 F. Supp. 380 (N.D. Ill. 1939). Defendant company and its subsidiaries
were engaged in shipping goods in interstate commerce to fill mail orders
in many states throughout the country.
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hours is a proper exercise of the police power. Employer and employee
do not stand on a plane of equality. Wages, especially of unskilled
employees, tend towards the lowest point at which the laborer cannot
subsist. The resulting conditions are of interest not only to the wage
earner but to the whole community. The slums of our great cities are,
in large part, the fruits of low wages. Vice, crime and disease breed
in these districts and spread throughout the community. Certainly ...
it is not an unwarranted exercise of the police power to prescribe
minimum wages for the protection of the health and good order of
society." Here, it is apparent, the decision was placed on the first
finding of Congress, that the existence of certain labor conditions in
industries caused commerce and the channels and instrumentalities of
commerce to be used to spread and perpetuate such labor conditions
among the workers of the several states.
Whether on appeal the Supreme Court will uphold the act as valid
cannot be asserted with any certainty. Some basis for an expectation
that it may uphold the act is found in the fact that although the
Supreme Court denied to Congress the right to control hours and
wages in cases where the ultimate effect was merely to regulate a
purely local matter, it has never held that Congress did not have the
power to control such matters where they actually affected interstate
commerce. Rather it has upheld such regulation for a limited time
due to a grave and national emergency. 43 It has likewise affirmed an
act limiting the hours of railroad employees engaged in interstate
commerce, even though they may at the same time be engaged in
intrastate commerce, as a necessary measure to promote safety by
lessening the causes of fatigue. 44 Further, as in the case of prison
made goods, the Supreme Court could uphold the Fair Labor Standards Act" under the third finding of Congress, that existing conditions constitute an unfair method of competition in interstate commerce, since the products of free labor properly compensated cannot
successfully compete with the underpaid adult and child labor. Moreover, as in the cases involving the right of the employee to collective
bargaining as a necessary right to prevent labor disputes, the Supreme
Court may validly hold that a minimum wage is necessary to prevent
labor disputes which might burden commerce and the free flow of
goods in such commerce. Needless to say the question of minimum
wages and maximum hours is as prolific a source of labor disputes
as the right of an employee to collective bargaining. But while the
court has upheld the right of Congress to regulate such collective bar43 Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332, 37 Sup. Ct. 298, 61 L.Ed. 755 (1916).
44B. & 0. R. R.
4552 Stat. 1060,

Co. v. I. C. C., 221 U.S. 612, 31 Sup. Ct. 621, 55 L.Ed. 878 (1911).
29 U.S.C.A. 201-219 (1938).
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gaining when the employer agrees to bargain with any group, it has
never decided that an employer can be forced to bargain if he has not
decided to do so. In such a condition the question of minimum wages
and maximum hours might reach a very grave state and the National
Labor Relations Board would be powerless to intervene. A strike
resulting from such failure of the employer and employee to agree
would, in the case of an industry engaged in interstate commerce or
manufacturing for interstate commerce, burden and obstruct commerce and prevent the free flow of goods to market. It is obvious
that Congress has the right to regulate a matter that would burden
interstate commerce in such a manner. The Supreme Court has repeatedly asserted that Congress may use any means in accord with
due process to carry out its policy, once that policy has been found
to be within one of its enumerated powers. 46 If Congress choose to
regulate such commerce by prescribing what hours and wages are to
prevail therein, the Supreme Court can in conformity with its past
declarations uphold such regulations as valid. That it will, in view of
the added fact that the judicial opinion is undergoing a shift because
of recent changes in personnel, may confidently be expected.
THOMAS P. M~ARs

-0McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819) ; Ruppert v. Caffey,
251 U.S. 264, 40 Sup. Ct. 141, 64 L.Ed. 260 (1920) ; Kentucky Whip & Collar
Co. v. Ill. Cent. R. R. Co., 299 U.S. 334, 57 Sup. Ct. 277, 81 L. Ed. 270 (1937).

